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LIMITING THE USE OF THE RICO ACT
AS A DEFENSE TO HOSTILE CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS

Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 1
In addition to providing criminal penalties, 2 RICO contains a civil
remedy for those injured by violations of the statute. 3 Although RICO
was initially used primarily in criminal prosecutions, the use of the
civil remedy has increased dramatically in recent years and has expanded
to cases not involving organized criminal activity. 4 One of the most
recent and most controversial expansions of civil RICO occurred in
securities litigation. s
Corporations recently began using RICO's civil remedy to resist hostile
corporate takeovers. 6 This use of the Act raises fundamental questions
about the scope of the statute and the desirability of limiting its application. The use of RICO as a defense to hostile corporate takeovers
also raises important questions regarding the interaction between RICO
and the federal securities laws. Although several courts and commentators suggest that Congress intended some overlap between.RICO and
the securities laws, the extent of this overlap is difficult to define. 7
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 18 u.s.c. § 1963 (1976).
3. 18 u.s.c. § 1964 (1976).
4. See Barhart, RICO: A Curse or Blessing?, Chicago Tribune, April 27, 1983, § 3, at 11,
col. 3; see also Sylvester, Civil RICO's New Punch, Nat') L.J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (suggesting that the increase in civil RICO actions is due to former federal prosecutors, trained in
the use of RICO, who use the advantages of a civil RICO suit for their clients).
5. See MacIntosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Powerful New Tool
of the Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 U. KAN. L. REY. 7, 12 (1982). Some commentators
predict that the use of civil RICO in general securities litigation will increase in the future. See
Pickholz & Friedman, Civil RICO Actions, 14 REv. SEC. REo. 965, 970 (1981). Moreover, some
commentators express concern that civil RICO cases are "mushrooming" to such an extent in
the securities area that even blue chip financial institutions are threatened by civil RICO actions.
See Lewin, Targets of Racketeering Law, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1983, § D, at 1, col. 3.
6. See, e.g.; Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Bayly Corp. v. Marantelle,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 198,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Victory Markets, Inc. v. Nelson, No. 81-CV-1370, slip
op. (N.D.N.Y. March 26, 1982, as amended, April I, 1982) (available Sept. 28, 1983, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (pre-takeover use of the RICO act); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 198,603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1982); Spencer
Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361.
(D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
7. See, e.g., Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See generally Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested
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This Note argues that RICO could be a legitimate defense to a hostile
corporate takeover pursuant to a cash tender offer if shareholders who
retain stock will be harmed by the takeover. Part I of this Note examines the general background of the RICO Act. Part II applies the
Act to a hostile cash tender offer and examines each element of a civil
RICO action. Part III advocates the use of RICO's injury requirement
to limit this application of the Act and analyzes the potential injuries
to shareholders and management during a hostile cash tender offer.
This limitation upon the use of RICO conforms with the language and
scope of the Act, as well as with the policies and current application
of the federal securities laws.
I.

AN OVERVIEW

OF THE

RICO ACT

Congress enacted RICO to weaken the economic base of organized
crime by specifically attacking its infiltration of legitimate businesses. 8
Congress also intended to limit the effect of this infiltration on interstate commerce and on free competition in the marketplace. 9
Although RICO provided new tools for attacking organized crime, 10

Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 8S DICK. L. REv. 201, 201-06,
22S-28 (1981).
8. In 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976), Congress found that "organized crime in the United States
is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct. . . . [that] this money and power are
increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business . . . . " {Congressional Statement
of Findings and Purpose). Organized crime usually obtains control of legitimate businesses through
extortion, investing profits from illegal activities into legitimate enterprises, accepting an interest
in a legitimate business in payment of its owner's gambling debts, and foreclosing on usurious
loans. Legislative Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. S46, 622-27
(1971). Organized crime seeks control of legitimate businesses for several reasons: to obtain a
respectable "cover," to acquire a base through which to deal with public officials, to "wash"
illegal income, and to obtain a "hedge against unfavorable conditions in the criminal world." Note,
The Pennsylvania Attack on Racketeers in Legitimate Enterprises, 78 DicK. L. REv. 176, 176
(1973) (citing PENNSYLVANIA CRIME CoMMISSION, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 49 (1970)); see
also Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Distinguishing the "Enterprise"
Issues, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1343, 13S5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Enterprise Issues].
9. The introduction to the RICO Act states that "organized crime activities in the United
States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, [and) seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
10. Congress noted that RICO improves the evidence-gathering process, provides new criminal
prohibitions and enhanced sanctions, and establishes new remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976)
(Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose). Before the adoption of RICO, prosecutors
faced many barriers to successful prosecution of organized crime's infiltration of legitimate
businesses. These barriers included the piecemeal approach of federal law, reliance on ineffective
state Jaws, the difficulty of proving involvement of those in the higher echelons of organized
crime's structure, and a replacement effect whereby the conviction of one person merely resulted
in the promotion of another syndicate member to take his place. See Legislative Note, supra
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it has remained the most controversial and most litigated part of the
entire Organized Crime Control Act. 11
Any action under RICO must establish a pattern of racketeering.
RICO defines racketeering as the violation of specific state and federal
laws ranging from murder and extortion to mail and wire fraud. 12 A
pattern of racketeering is defined as at least two predicate acts of
racketeering committed within a period of ten years. 13 Although courts
generally require specific allegations of the predicate acts of
racketeering, 14 RICO does not prohibit the racketeering activity itself;

note 8, at 622; Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis
of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REv. 441,442 (1980).
11. See Note, Aiding and Abetting the Investment of Dirty Money: Mens Rea and the
Nonracketeer Under RICO Section 1962(a), 82 Couru. L. REv. 574, 575 (1982).
12. Racketeering includes acts or threats involving state offenses such as murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealings in narcotics; acts indictable under
the federal laws on bribery, counterfeiting, extortionate credit transactions, mail fraud, wire fraud,
or interstate transportation of stolen property; acts indictable under certain federal laws relating
to labor organizations; and any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities,
or dealings in narcotics. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1981).
13. In 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976), a pattern of racketeering "requires at least two acts.of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
Courts disagree concerning the degree of interrelationship that must exist between the two
predicate acts of racketeering. The majority view follows the literal language of the statute and
holds that the two acts need not be related to each other as long as they both relate to the
same enterprise whose affairs affect interstate commerce. E.g., United States v. Weisman, 624
F.2d 1118, 1122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Gibson, 486 F.
Supp. 1230, 1242 (S.D. Ohio 1980); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); see also Blakey & Gettings, RICO: Evening Up the Odds, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 58, 59
n.34. Courts following this approach do not require that the pattern consist of two separate
illegal schemes but rather find separate acts of racketeering present even if the two predicate
acts are a series of steps in achieving one objective. E.g., United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d
673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d
595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public
Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. Cim1. L. REv. 655, 657 n.19 (1982).
On the other hand, a minority of courts do require some interrelationship between the two
predicate acts of racketeering in order to constitute a pattern. E.g., United States v. Ladmer,
429 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (for a pattern of racketeering the predicate acts must
be connected by a common scheme); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609,614 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (the predicate acts must have a factual nexus in order to constitute a pattern and must
be connected by a common scheme), afj'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert:
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Some commentators share this view. E.g., Bradley, Racketeers,
Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837, 863-64 (1980); Note,
supra note 10, at 477.
14. See, e.g., Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558
F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah 1983) (dismissing RICO claim because of insufficient allegation of the
predicate acts of racketeering); Maun'ber v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing civil RICO claim because of insufficient allegation of securities fraud);
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing RICO claim
because of a lack of particularity regarding the alleged fraud); Englund v. Mathews, No. 81
Civ. 3017 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1981) (available Sept. 28, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
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it prohibits the impact of racketeering on interstate commerce. 15
Section 1962 of the Act defines the violations of RICO, which include: (a) using income from racketeering to acquire· an interest in an
enterprise affecting interstate commerce;' 6 (b) using racketeering to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate
commerce; 11 (c) conducting the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering; 18 and (d) conspiring to commit any of the above acts. ' 9 Each violation focuses on
the effect of racketeering activity on an interstate enterprise. 20

file) (dismissing RICO count for insufficient allegation of securities fraud), withdrawn, Mar.
25, 1982; Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78 Civ. 3994, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1979) (available
Sept. 28, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (dismissing RICO claim because there were
no allegations to support racketeering), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1072 (1978). Although the racketeering must have an effect on interstate commerce,
the effect need not be significant. Cf. United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 35 (2d Cir. 1981)
Gurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act is satisfied by a slight effect on interstate commerce), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982). But see United States v. Karas, 624 F.2d 500, 504
(4th Cir. 1980) (impact on interstate commerce is irrelevant in a criminal RICO prosecution),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who
has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
•.. to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person through
a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce."
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed
by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . . " One court has held that the
racketeering must benefit or advance the affairs of the enterprise. United States v. Webster,
639 F.2d 174, 184-85 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981). Most courts, however, do
not impose this requirement. E.g., United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-62 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). In addition, a plaintiff in a § 1962(c) RICO action
must show that defendants conducted the affairs of the enterprise through racketeering as opposed to an individual using the enterprise to conduct racketeering in his individual capacity.
See, e.g., United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1977) (although defendants
used a trailer park [the alleged enterprise] as the location for their gambling operation [the alleged racketeering activity], there was insufficient evidence of how the affairs of the enterprise were
conducted through racketeering), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
20. An "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). The "enterprise" element has caused controversy, however, in situations where it is difficult to separate the enterprise from the pattern of racketeering. This would
occur, for example, when defendants are prosecuted under RICO for conducting an arson ring
(the "enterprise"). To handle such cases, some courts impose additional requirements before
finding the presence of an enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th
Cir. 1982) (members of an enterprise must have a common or shared purpose; the enterprise
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A criminal prosecution for a violation of section 1962 is not contingent upon prosecutions for the predicate acts of racketeering. 21 A
conviction under RICO subjects the offender to severe penalties, including fines up to $25,000, imprisonment up to twenty years, or both. 22
The offender may also be forced to forfeit any interest that was acquired or maintained in violation of the Act. 23
Apart from criminal sanctions, RI CO provides a civil remedy for those
injured by a violation of section 1962. 24 Civil RICO actions provide procedural advantages, 25 as well as the possibility of broad injunctive relief, 26
must have continuity of structure and personnel; and the structure of the enterprise must be
distinct from the pattern of racketeering), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 739 (1983); United States
v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.) (an enterprise requires continuity of structure beyond
that necessary for the pattern of racketeering and participants must maintain a common purpose), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th
Cir. 1980) (an enterprise must have an ascertainable structure, maintain operations toward an
economic goal, and have an existence apart from the pattern of racketeering), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981). For a discussion of the enterprise issue, see generally MacIntosh, supra note
5, at 48; Enterprise Issues, supra note 8; Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back
Into RICO: Sections 1962 and /964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 100 (1981).
21. E.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
820 (1975).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
23. Id. The RICO Act is the first federal criminal statute to apply forfeiture directly against
- a convicted person rather than use a subsequent in rem proceeding. See United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); see also Note, RICO Forfeitures
and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 345 (1982).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976) provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court ..•. " Because RICO's broad civil remedies were considered more
threatening and damaging to a defendant than a criminal RICO prosecution, some early commentary suggested that Congress intended that only the government bring a civil RICO action.
See, e.g., Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers
in Criminal Law, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 41, 52 (1970). The prevailing view, however, is that
a private party may also maintain a civil RICO action. See, e.g., Comment, Tttle IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of the Issues Arising in its Interpretation,
27 DE PAULL. REv. 89, 90 (1977). Professor Blakey, one of the principal drafters of the Act,
shares this view and explains that RICO's civil remedy was patterned after the antitrust civil
remedy because of the effectiveness of the civil remedy as a complement to criminal prosecutions
in that area. Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1040 (1980); see also Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action In Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
237, 348 (1982) (treble damage remedy included to encourage private actions); Legislative Note,
supra note 8, at 625 (predicting that RICO's civil remedy would ultimately have a greater impact
than its criminal penalties). The drafters of RICO hoped that the civil remedy would be used
as frequently as the civil remedy provided by the antitrust laws. E.g., Barhart, supra note 4,
at col. 3.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1976) provides broad authorization for venue and service of process.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976) provides for divestiture of a violator's interest in an enterprise, restrictions on his future activities, and dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
Because of the seriousness of these remedies, courts exercise care in granting injunctive relief
to avoid prejudice to the rights of innqcent third parties. See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 815 (\V.D. Ky.) (freezing the assets of the defendant
pursuant to a civil RICO action), aff'd, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
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treble damages, 21 and recovery of attorneys fees. 28 Furthermore, a civil
RICO action does not require a criminal RICO conviction. 29
Given the broad language of the Act and the relative ease with which
a plaintiff can add a RICO count to any action, 30 some courts express
concern about the excessive expansion of civil RICO. 31 Although the
use of civil RICO requires some restriction, 32 any limitation on its use
should not preclude actions by legitimate victims of racketeering. 33 As
this Note illustrates, the use of civil RICO as a defense to a hostile
corporate takeover can appropriately be limited by considering the Act's
injury requirement and the interaction between RICO and the federal
securities 'laws.
II.

APPLYING THE

RICO

ACT AS A DEFENSE TO A HOSTILE

CORPORATE TAKEOVER

A corporate takeover occurs when the purchase of a percentage of
The structure of RICO has caused some confusion regarding the availability of private injunctive relief. Section 1964(a) grants authority for injunctive relief to federal district courts. Section
1964(b) authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil RICO action. Section 1964(c) describes
the damages remedy and authorizes "any person" to bring suit. Some courts suggest that this
statutory structure may authorize only the Government to obtain injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561
F. Supp. 301, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1360
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 2183 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983). This relatively new interpretation
of the Act is not shared by the majority of the courts or commentators. See, e.g., Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 24, at 1014; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 13, at 60.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 3ll, 314 (N.D. III. 1979).
At least one court disagrees with this application of the statute and suggests that a civil RICO
action be conditioned on a criminal conviction or indictment. Kleiner v. First Nat') Bank, 526
F. Supp'. 1019, 1022 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, (1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,772,
at 93,923 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982) (in dismissing a RICO claim in which a woman sued her
ex-husband for fraudulently depriving her of ownership of stock, the court said Congress did
not intend to federalize common law fraud and create a RICO action in every case of fraud);
Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
198,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) ("It is not too difficult to allege sufficient facts
to add a RICO count to many kinds of civil cases, thus greatly expending [sic] the scope of
litigation.").
31. For example, civil RICO claims have appeared in cases far removed from Congress's
probable intent. See, e.g., Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (civil RICO
claim allowed where plaintiff sued her father's widow for fraud upon her father's estate).
32. See, e.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 177 (1982); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), qff'd, 52 U.S.L.W.
2183 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983); Landmark Sav. & Loan"· Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich.
1981). Although courts wish to limit the scope of civil RICO, the difficulty of accomplishing
this has led one court to conclude that it is impossible to establish fixed rules for RICO's application and that each case must be decided individually. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d
387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 13, at 707.
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corporate stock enables the purchaser to take control of the corporation and effect significant changes in its management, operations, or
policy. 34 Target corporations vulnerable to takeovers typically have stock
with a book value greater than the market price, a broad base of
shareholders without strong ties to the corporation, and weak or unaggressive management. 35 Although takeovers can occur by a variety of
methods, 36 they most often occur through a tender offer for the target's
stock. 37 Cash tender offers are most frequently used, 38 and are subject
to extensive regulation by federal3 9 and state securities laws. 40
34. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (5th
ed. 1982). Due to widespread stock ownership and stockholder inertia in a large public corporation, ownership of less than 50% of the outstanding stock can mean de facto control of the
corporation. See, e.g., Blustein, Let Us Now Consider Carl Icahn, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1982,
§ 1, at 14, col. 3 (suggesting that ownership of 25-30% of stock can mean control of the targeJ:);
Greenhill, Structuring an Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1307 (1977) (suggesting that ownership of
40% can mean effective control of the target).
35. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, REsPONSES, AND PLANNING 1-2 (1981);
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1978). Target corporations are also often
characterized by a low price/earnings ratio, a low debt/capital ratio, high liquidity or excessive
cash reserves, a strong record of earning stability, absence of strong state antitakeover statutes
in the target's state of incorporation, and limited insider control. See, e.g., Comment, Antitakeover
Maneuvers: Developments in Defense Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw.
L.J. 617, 619 (1981).
36. A purchaser may effect a takeover by purchasing shares of stock through private transactions, through brokers in the open market, or through a public offer to shareholders. See Lipton, Open Market Purchases, 32 Bus. LAW. 1321 (1977).
37. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 34, at 626. A "tender offer" has the following
characteristics: solicitation of public shareholders in which a bidder attempts to purchase a substantial percentage of stock by offering a price significantly above the market price, fixed terms
of the offer, completion of the offer is contingent on the bidder acquiring a stated percentage
of shares, a fixed period of time during which the offer is held open and public shareholders
may be pressured to sell, and a public announcement of the purchasing program. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 293-94 (1982). Although the federal securities laws do
not define a tender offer, most courts require that these factors be present before a tender offer
is found. Id. In some circumstances these factors may be broadly construed. See, e.g., S-G Sec.,
Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1124-25 (D. Mass. 1978) {tender offer provisions
of the federal securities laws applied when there was a public announcement of an intent to
control the target corporation followed by the rapid purchase of large blocks of stock through
the open market and privately negotiated transactions).
38. See W. T. GRIMM & Co., 1978 MERGER SUMMARY 17 (1979) (cash was the medium of
payment in 5711/o of the public takeovers occurring in 1978); see also Fischel, supra note 35,
at 2 (the cash tender offer is the most effective and most favored means of obtaining corporate
control); Note, The Williams Amendments: An Evaluation of the Early Returns, 23 VAND, L.
REv. 700, 702 (1970) (the cash tender offer is the most effective takeover method).
As an alternative to paying cash for the shares of the target corporation, a tender offeror
may use an exchange offer and offer shares of stock in the takeover corporation. R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, supra note 34, at 626. Cash tender offers are currently used more frequently than
exchange offers. Id.
39. Until the passage of the Williams Act in 1978, cash tender offers were essentially
unregulated. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 37, at 276. The Williams Act amended the Securities
Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). See infra notes 64-65.
40. By 1979, thirty-seven states had enacted statutes regulating tender offers. R. JENNINGS
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A hostile takeover pursuant to a tender offer frequently operates
as a useful check on inefficient incumbent management of the target
corporation. 41 Nonetheless, incumbent management often utilizes a
variety of methods to resist the tender offer. 42 Although such resistance
& H. MARsH, supra note 34, at 631. The constitutionality of these statutes is questionable, however,
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Court
declared the Illinois takeover statute unconstitutional because it imposed a substantial burden
on interstate commerce that outweighed any local benefits. Id. at 643-46.
41. Many commentators suggest that because target corporations are characterized by inefficient and less successful management, the threat of a takeover provides an incentive for improved management. See, e.g., Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS
L. REv. 609, 627 (1967) (incumbent target management is usually less successful than would
be expected); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981) (prospective tender offerers look
for targets whose management can be improved) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel,
Proper Role]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare,
36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 174S (1981) (incumbent management is frequently replaced after a successful
tender offer) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids); Fischel, supra note
3S, at 7 (the empirical evidence supports the view that targets are poorly managed). Other commentators disagree, however, and suggest that even if the true value of the target's shares is
greater than the market price, this may be caused by factors other than inefficient target management. See, e.g., Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile
Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403, 455-56 (1980) (a takeover does not necessarily lead to increased efficiency in the management of the target if the acquiring corporation had motives other
than increased productivity); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal
for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 306 (1983) (undervaluation of the target's stock may
be beyond management's control). Although the effect of takeovers on managerial efficiency remains controversial, a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report on tender offers
acknowledged that, in certain cases, the tender offer is a discipline on inefficient target management. SEC ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS, FED. SEC.
L. REP. SPECIAL REPORT (CCH) 8 (July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as SEC ADVISORY CoMMITTEE).
42. In resisting a takeover attempt, a target corporation may (1) amend the shareholder
voting procedure to make shareholder-initiated changes more difficult; (2) reincorporate in a
state with a strict antitakeover statute; (3) issue additional shares in friendly hands to increase
the percentage of stock needed for control; (4) acquire another corporation that would pose
antitrust problems for the tender offeror; (5) pressure shareholders not to sell to the takeover
corporation; (6) issue stock splits or dividends as an inducement for shareholders to retain their
stock; (7) litigate under federal or state securities laws to obtain an injunction against the takeover
or at least to delay the takeover; (8) attempt a counter-takeover of the takeover corporation
itself; or (9) seek a friendly bidder (a "white knight") who then issues a competing tender offer.
W. CARY & M. EtsENBER0, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1594-96 (5th ed. 1980);
see also Fischel, supra note 35, at 30-40; Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 9 REv.
SEC. REG. 853 (1976). Some commentators suggest that target management's resistance to a takeover
attempt may be so strong that management may be willing to do "almost anything" to oppose
the takeover. E.g., Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 250. Moreover, some of the methods used to
resist the takeover have opportunity costs for the target corporation. For example, the resources
spent to oppose the takeover could be used for new plants, new equipment, or shareholder dividends
Blustein, supra note 34.
Some tender offerers may forego a takeover attempt if faced with hostile target management.
A hostile takeover consumes more time, increases legal costs, and may increase the price ultimately paid for the stock if the target company enlists a competing bidder. Se,e P. STEINER,
MERGERS 175 (1975) (contested tender offers may double the cost of effecting the takeover);
Troubh, Characteristics of Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAw. 1301, 1303 (1977) (during a hostile
takeover, a tender offerer's legal fees alone can exceed $2 million).
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sometimes protects the best interest of the target corporation's
shareholders, 43 it is frequently an effort merely to preserve management's position and control of the corporation. 44 Recently, target corporations have used RICO to resist hostile tender offers. 45 This use
of the Act poses serious practical, analytical, and policy problems. 46
One of the initial problems in this application of RICO is whether
the Act can apply in an action not involving organized crime. 47
43. Resistance to the takeover may be appropriate if the target's shareholders who retain
their stock will be worse off after the takeover because of the tender offeror's actions upon
obtaining control. Such situations do occur, albeit infrequently. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
Some commentators suggest that resistance will increase the likelihood of enlisting a competing bidder and thus benefit the target's shareholders. The premium offered for the target's
shares reflects the difference between the market value of the shares and the value which would
be attained if the tender offeror controlled the target. The tender offeror, however, will seek
to pay less than the "true" value of the shares in order to maximize this anticipated profit.
The target's resistance to the takeover puts other potential tender offerors on notice, and may
induce them to offer a higher price, and thus increase the benefit to shareholders who tender.
Moreover, if the new tender offeror, who is willing to pay a higher premium, acquires control,
the target's assets will then be in the hands of a higher-value utilizer which should increase
the appreciation of the investment of the shareholders who do not tender. Thus, by stimulating
a competing bidder, the target's resistance actually benefits its shareholders. See, e.g., Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv.
23 (1982); Bradley, Interjirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, in ECONOMICS
OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGTJLATION 222 (R. Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980); Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. R.Ev.
51 (1982); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender
Offers, 61 CHI. B. REc. 152 (1979). Contra Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs
in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. I (1982) (arguing that allowing target resistance to raise
the premium does not benefit shareholders).
44. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 34, at 643, 673; Easterbrook & Fischel,
Proper Role, supra note 41, at 1175; Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 41, at 438; Herzel, Schmidt
& Davis, supra note 43, at 145; McIntyre, Shareholders' Recourse Under Federal Securities Law
Against Management for Opposing Advantageous Tender Offers, 34 Bus. LAW. 1283, 1283-84
(1979).
45. See supra note 6.
46. Using RICO in this context presents serious consequences given the broad remedies of
the Act and the large number of hostile tender offers in which RICO may be involved. See
W. T. GRIMM & Co., supra note 38, at 16; see also Brudney, supra note 41, at 609 (use of
the cash tender offer is increasing); Flom, The Role of the Takeover in the American Economy,
32 Bus. LAW. 1299 (1977) (a growing number of companies are willing to use takeovers); R.
JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 34, at 626 (tender offers have become increasingly popular
as a method of obtaining control of a corporation); Jorden & Woodward, An Appraisal of
Disclosure Requirements in Contests/or Control Under the Williams Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L.
R.Ev. 817, 817 (1978) (the tender offer is an increasingly popular and acceptable method of acquiring control).
47. In one of the recent hostile takeover cases involving RICO, the court questioned this
use of the RICO Act because there was no evidence of organized crime. Dan River, Inc. v.
Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Congress was out to attack the problem of organized
crime, not the problems of corporate control and risk arbitrage."). But see Hanna Mining Co.
v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., (1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 198,742
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (no involvement with organized crime is necessary to use a civil RICO
action as a defense to a hostile corporate takeover; any restriction of this kind should come
from Congress and not the courts).

66

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:1

Although RICO's legislative history contains many references to
organized crime, 48 the actual language of the Act omits any requirement of an affiliation with organized crime. 49 Some courts, however,
rely on the legislative history rather than the statutory language and
require proof of the defendant's affiliation with organized crime. 50 Still,
most courts 51 and several commentators, 52 including one of the principal drafters of the Act, 53 reject this view.
Courts and commentators offer several reasons to support the majority position that a RICO action does not require involvement of

48. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1910 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 4007, 4033; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1979); see also 116
CONG. REc. 530, 585-86, 591-92, 602-03, 607, 953 (1970) (Senate debates); id. at 35,196, 35,200,
35,206, 35,295-96, 35,304, 35,319, 35,361-62 (House debates). For a detailed description of
RICO's legislative history, see Blakey, supra note 24, at 249-80.
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
50. Because the legislative history contains many .references to organized crime, some courts
require involvement of organized crime as part of the true purpose or spirit of RICO. Thus,
even though a cause of action may fall within the literal language of the statute, these courts
hold that, because of the lack of involvement of organized crime, the case does not fall within
the purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Wagner v. Bear, Steams & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 199,032 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. LeBlanc,
No. 80-1583-5, slip op. (D.S.C. May 19, 1982) (available Sept. 28, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Noonan
v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards,
527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981). Moreover, at least one court has dismissed a RICO claim
because of the damage to a defendant's reputation by being labeled a "racketeer" and the resulting
connotation of involvement with organized crime. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
51. See, e.g., Schact v. Brown, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
99,160, at 95,604 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United
States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1975); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F.
Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United
States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty,
513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
52. See, e.g., MacIntosh, supra note 5, at 31; Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 13,
at 665-88. The RICO Act applies to all who commit the enumerated offenses regardless of any
involvement with organized crime. See, e.g., Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOI.OGY 1, 3 (1978); McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970); Wilson, supra note 24, at 48-50;
Comment, supra note 24, at l 12; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101, 1106-09 (1982)_.
53. Professor Blakey, one of the authors of the RICO Act, states that although the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime was the manifest purpose of the RICO ~ct, this
was not the Act's only purpose. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 24, at 1011-14. Moreover, RICO's
title refers to racketeer influenced (i.e., enterprises affected by racketeering) as distinct from
corrupt organizations (i.e., traditional organized criminal activity). Id. at 1025 n.91.
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organized crime. First, requiring an affiliation with organized crime
contradicts the plain and unapibiguous language of the statute. 54 Second, RICO does not make organized crime unlawful, but instead prohibits certain activities without regard to who engages in them. ss Third,
the legislative history indicates that Congress recognized that RICO
would apply to situations not involving organized crime: 56 Indeed, Congress recognized that the term "organized crime" defies precise
definition. 57 Finally, Congress directed that RICO be "liberally

54. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the plain language of a statute offers
the primary evidence of congressional intent. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
310 U.S. 534 (1940); see also Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL
L. REv. 167, 169 (1980) (suggesting that RICO's plain and unambiguous language should govern).
However, the Supreme Court has also stated that if the plain meaning of the statutory language
is at variance with the policy of the statute, then the policy should be followed rather than the
literal language. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543. Before this principle can be applied
to the RICO Act, however, a court must first determine whether the policy behind RICO is
limited to the explicit references to organized crime in the legislative history or to the explicit
omission of any such requirement in the statutory language.
In addition, courts usually hold that, when the language of a statute contains no ambiguities,
legislative history should not be examined because the function of legislative history is to solve
rather than to create ambiguities. E.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.• 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). For example, in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978),
the Court held that a conviction under the Hobbs Act did not require a showing that the defendant was involved with "racketeering" because no such requirement was present in the language
of the statute. The Court declined to infer such a requirement because of the absence of any
indication in the language of the statute that it was to be limited to "racketeering," the recognition that a requirement of "racketeering" would pose constitutional problems by creating a status
offense, the lack of any precise definition of "racketeering," and the absence of any indication
that Congress did not intend to punish those whose conduct fell within the reach of the statutory
language.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1975); see also
Atkinson, supra note 52, at 3. Furthermore, limiting the application of the Act to members
of organized crime would create a status offense and jeopardize the constitutionality of the Act.
See McClellan, supra note 52, at 60-62.
56. During the Congressional debates, several critics of RICO recognized and vigorously argued
against the potential application of the Act beyond traditional organized crime. See generally
Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 13, at 681-85. These critics proposed an amendment
to RICO which would have limited the Act to traditional organized crime (i.e., the "Mafia"
or "La Cosa Nostra"). Id. Congress rejected the amendment because of the potential Constitutional problems posed by the creation of a status offense. Id.
In addition, the late Senator John McClellan, one of the sponsors of the Organized Crime
Control Act, which included RICO, acknowledged that "those who are not engaged in organized
crime ... nonetheless are within the incidental reach of provisions primarily intended to affect
organized crime." McClellan, supra note 52, at 62. "Unless an individual not only commits
such a crime but engages in a pattern of such violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or
operate an interest in an interstate business, he is not made subject to proceedings under [RICO]."
Id. at 144. Thus, the sponsors of the RICO Act recognized that "[i]t is impossible to draw
an effective statute which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does
not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." Id. at 143.
57. Atkinson, supra note 52, at 9-10; Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 13, at 675-80;
Wilson, supra note 24, at 47. Although some courts attempt to define organized crime, these
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construed.,,ss These considerations lead most courts and corrunentators
to interpret broadly the term "organized crime" as it appears in RICO's
legislative history. 59 These factors also indicate that any limitation on
civil RICO as a defense to a hostile corporate takeover should not
be based on a requirement of organized crime. Rather, RICO can be
appropriately limited by examining the three elements necessary to sus-·
tain a civil RICO action: a pattern of racketeering activity, a violation
of section 1962, and an injury due to the violation of section 1962.

A.

Pattern of Racketeering

RICO defines a pattern of racketeering as at least two predicate acts
of racketeering committed within a period of ten years. 60 A target corporation, using RICO as a defense to a hostile tender offer, may easily
allege two predicate acts of racketeering. Because of the complex federal
statutory requirements with which a tender offeror must comply, a
target corporation could almost always allege that violations of the
federal securities laws constitute predicate acts of racketeering. 61

definitions present as many new interpretative issues as they purport to solve. For an example
of this, see Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.}, afj'd, 52 U.S.L.W.
2183 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983). In contrast, other courts define organized crime "as that term
is commonly used and understood." Wagner v. Bear, Steams & Co., (1982-1983 Transfer Binder)
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH} 199,032, at 94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982). Furthermore, some
commentators suggest that any definitional requirements would place an unreasonable evidentiary burden on prosecutors in proving an affiliation with organized crime because of the ability
of organized crime to camouflage its existence. See Mcaellan, supra note 52, at 60; see also
Comment, supra note 24, at 112.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) provides that "[t]he provisions of this title ... shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose). Courts repeatedly follow this directive. See, e.g., United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp.
788 (M.D. Pa. 1978); see also Note, supra note 54.
59. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO focuses on any
effect of racketeering on the free market system); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 911
(5th Cir.} (RICO is primarily concerned with group crime rather than individual crime}, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974)
(RICO prohibits any racketeering activity which affects commerce}, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D. W. Va. 1979) (RICO prohibits
any business takeover effected through illegal activity}; United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp.
41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (organized crime as used in the RICO Act is broadly defined); Blakey
& Gettings, supra note 24, at 1017 n.45, 1018 n.55 (because RICO was directed toward racketeering
committed by enterprises as well as the effect of racketeering on these enterprises, the Act applies to all types of "enterprise criminality"); Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 13, at
688 (RICO applies to virtually all corporate crime and white collar crime}.
60. See supra note 13.
61. This is particularly true with regard to the statements of intent and other information
which must be filed with the SEC. Weinberg, Mother of God, ls This the End of RICO?, 69
A.B.A. J. 130 (1983); see also Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (because there is no such thing as a "perfect" tender offer, courts must
be vigilant and not allow trivial charges to stop a legitimate tender offer}.
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For example, most target corporations can allege that violations of
the securities laws constitute racketeering in a hostile tender offer under
RICO,s prohibition of "fraud in the sale of securities. ,, 62 Although
the courts have not determined the scope of this phrase, they have
held that it encompasses fraud committed by the purchaser of securities
(the tender offeror) as well as fraud committed by the seller. 63 Violations of the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws, particularly sections 14(e)64 and 13(d), 65 present the most likely ba~is for
the alleged fraud. 66

62. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(0) (Supp. V 1981).
63. See, e.g., Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 198,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981); see also MacIntosh, supra note
5, at 27-37.
64. A tender offeror must comply with §§ 14(d)-(e} of the federal securities laws. Section
14(d) requires that a tender offer that will result in an ownership of more than 50Jo of the total
outstanding stock cannot be issued unless the tender offeror provides certain information to
the SEC and to each offeree. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982). The tender offeror must disclose his
background and identity, the source of the funds used in making the purchase, the purpose
of the purchase, any plans the offeror has to liquidate the assets of the company or to make
major changes in the company's structure, and the extent of the offeror's current holdings in
the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982) (expressly incorporating the disclosure requirements
of § 78m(d)(I), also known as § 13(d)). Section 14(e) makes it unlawful to provide misleading
information or engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices in connection with a tender offer.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); see also Jorden & Woodward, supra note 46, at 819; Note, supra
note 38, at 709.
65. Section 13(d) requires that after a purchaser acquires more than 50Jo of the stock of a
company, certain information must be disclosed to the SEC and to the issuer of the securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982). For a listing of this information, see supra note 64. See also Jorden
& Woodward, supra note 46, at 820-21; Note, supra note 38, at 705-09.
66. A philosophy of full disclosure underlies all the federal securities laws. Full disclosure
eliminates certain abuses in the securities industry, provides a high standard of business ethics,
preserves public confidence in the industry, and supports its economic health. E.g., SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Courts still perceive the laws as maintaining standards of basic honesty and fair dealing. Victory Markets, Inc. v. Nelson, No. 81-CV-1370, slip
op. (N.D.N.Y. March 26, 1982, as amended, April 1, 1982) (available Sept. 28 1983, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
·
A target corporation may allege that the tender offeror committed securities fraud upon the
shareholders by withholding information required by the federal securities laws to be disclosed.
Nondisclosure violates the purposes of sections 13(d) and 14(d)-(e) which "were to give protection to shareholders in shifts of corporate control, to require prior disclosure if the shift occurred through a tender offer, and to require a post acquisition 13(d) filing if the shift occurred
otherwise." Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afj'd, 682 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983). Section 14 was specifically designed
to provide shareholders faced with a tender offer the information and time necessary to make
an informed investment decision. E.g., Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 910 (1979).
Although disclosure violations constitute securities fraud, some commentators question the
utility of the federal disclosure requirements. If the securities market is economically efficient,
then the market price of the target's stock reflects all publicly available information. Thus, the
disclosure requirements provide investors with no information which is not already available.
E.g., Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of
the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977); see also Jorden & Woodward, supra note
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A tcJ,rget could allege that the tender offeror's failure to disclose an
intention to acquire control of the target - or the true plans upon obtaining control - violates sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the federal securities
laws. 67 Most courts hold that such violations can also constitute predicate
acts of racketeering. 68 Because resistance to a hostile tender offer usually
involves some alleged violations of sections 13(d) and 14(e), 69 a target
corporation can easily use these violations to establish predicate acts
of ra~keteering and append a RICO action to a claim. 70
In addition to using violations of the federal securities laws to establish
predicate acts of racketeering, a target corporation may allege mail
or wire fraud to fulfill RICO's pattern requirement. 11 Because a hostile
46. Other commentators disagree with the proposition that the securities market operates at a
level of total economic efficiency. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 254.
67. The disclosure requirements of§§ 13(d) and 14(e) are designed to provide investors, faced
with a tender offer, all the information necessary to decide whether to tender their shares. See,
e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977) (suggesting that violations
of the disclosure requirements harm the shareholders of the target corporation who are unable
to estimate accurately the value of their shares). Nondisclosure of certain information, such as
a tender offeror's plans for the target, violates the securities laws if a reasonable investor would
consider the information important in deciding whether to tender the shares. See, e.g., General
Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Because an informed
investment decision requires information regarding potential changes in corporate control, the
tender offeror's failure to disclose the intent to obtain control, or the plans upon obtaining control, violates the disclosure requirements of the securities laws. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 1973) (failure to disclose an intent to
acquire control of a corporation constitutes a violation of§§ 14(d)•(e)); see also Cohen, A Note
on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149, 151 (1966).
68. See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (implying that violations of§
14(e) can constitute racketeering); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1982) (implying that violations of § 13(d)
can constitute racketeering); Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (violations of§ 13(d) can constitute
a pattern of racketeering). But see Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, (1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (emphasizing that, although there was insufficient evidence of any securities Jaw violation, §§ 13(d) and 14(e) should not be used to establish
a pattern of racketeering); Macintosh,_su~ra note 5, at 32 (questioning whether a§ 13(d) violation
can constitute fraud in the sale of securities).
69. R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 34, at 671; see also Fischel, supra note 35, at
14, 36; Fleischer, supra note 42, at 863; Jorden & Woodward, supra note 46, at 822.
70. Some courts express the concern that a civil RICO action may become an alternative
or cumulative remedy for securities fraud. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp.
1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (the RICO Act is not a remedy for an ordinary securities violation), aff'd,
52 U.S.L.W. 2183 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983); Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, (1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (the RICO Act is not an alternative
or cumulative remedy for securities fraud). Although the limitation of civil RICO claims is a
valid concern, courts should not refuse to allow violations of §§ 13(d) and 14(e) to establish
predicate acts of racketeering given the clear case law and the language of the RICO Act. Furthermore, the principal drafter of RICO maintains that Congress was aware that RICO went
beyond traditional common Jaw fraud and actually intended the Act to apply to ordinary commercial fraud. Blakey, supra note 24, at 280, 305.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1976), as incorporated into 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1981).
See, e.g., Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also supra note 13.
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tender offer involves extensive use of the mails and wires, 72 the application of this provision potentially may convert every mail or wire
fraud claim into a RICO claim; and may also increase the use of federal
actions for state common law fraud claims. 73 This potential for abuse
has led some courts to dismiss RICO claims based in part on mail
or wire fraud. 74 Nonetheless, the mail and wire fraud provisions of
the Act offer another way to establish predicate acts of racketeering
and thus facilitate the use of RICO as a defense to a hostile tender offer.
Finally, courts express concern over the often limited connection between the predicate acts of racketeering and the alleged RICO violation. The predicate acts may only indirectly relate to the RICO violation in either time or purpose. For example, even though a hostile tender
offer may involve no disclosure violations of the federal securities laws,
a target corporation may still use RICO to resist the tender offer by
alleging, as predicate acts of racketeering; the tender offeror's past
behavior. Although this past behavior may have resulted in illegalities,
the nexus between these illegalities and the tender offer may prove
tenuous at best. 75 Although this strategy technically conforms to the
literal language of RICO's pattern requirement, it raises serious policy
questions because it confers an additional weapon upon the target corporation to fight a hostile takeover. The potential for abuse in this
area is significant given the increasing overlap between civil RICO and
federal securities claims. 76
The ease with which a target corporation can establish predicate acts
to constitute a pattern of racketeering indicates that this element of
72. The tender offeror may submit the offer to the target's shareholders through a newspaper
advertisement, a general mailing to all shareholders, a telephone solicitation, or any combination
of the above. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 34, at 633.
73. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 13, at 866 (every mail fraud case has the potential to be
a RICO case); MacIntosh, supra note 5, at 13, 18 (the inclusion of mail fraud increases the
ease with which RICO can be used); Tarlow, RICO: Someone Loaded the Dice, 17 TRIAL, Feb.
1981, at 54, 51 (the inclusion of mail fraud in RICO could federalize all torts involving business
transactions).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (expressing concern
about the expanding use of the federal mail fraud statute in the application of the RICO Act);
Pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 5S4 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (dismissing ·a RICO claim based in
part on a mail fraud violation because use of the mails during one act of common law fraud
does not create a federal mail fraud violation). But see Eaby v. Richmond, S61 F. Supp. 131
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (mail fraud can be the basis of a civil RICO action).
75. See, for example, Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983), where the
target corporation alleged that the tender offeror purchased shares using income from an investment
company which was not properly registered with the SEC and thus violated the Investment Company
Act of 1940. This alleged violation together with mail fraud constituted the primary basis for
the alleged pattern of racketeering. The court dismissed the RICO claim for insufficient evidence
of any violation.
16. See, e.g., Morrison, Old Bottle-Not So New Wine: Treble Damages in Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 67, 83 (1982) (suggesting that "RICO may well prove
to be to the 1980s what Rule lOb-5 was in its day").
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a civil RICO action cannot significantly limit the use of the Act to
resist a hostile tender offer. 11 Thus, any significant limitation on this
new use of RICO must be found in the other elements of a RICO claim.

B.

Violation of Section 1962

Once the target corporation establishes a pattern of racketeering,
it must demonstrate a violation of section 1962. The target may establish
the violation in four different ways. Each violation of section 1962
can be applied to hostile tender offers.
First, the target may allege a violation of section 1962(a) - the investment of income from racketeering in an enterprise which affects
interstate or foreign commerce. 78 The courts broadly interpret this provision to apply to any indirect investment of income or the proceeds
of such income. 79 Although the problem of tracing the inc01_ne from
the racketeering activity to the enterprise may make this provision difficult to apply in securities cases, 80 one target corporation successfully
alleged this violation in using RI CO to resist a hostile takeover. 81 The
problem of tracing, however, raises the issue of the directness of the
connection between the racketeering activity that produced ·the income
and the hostile tender offer. If the connection is too attenuated, the
use of RICO may defeat a tender offer that legal constraints would
otherwise leave untouched. 82
Second, the target corporation may allege a violation of section
1962(b) - the use of racketeering to acquire an interest in an enterprise
affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 83 This provision can easily
apply to general securities litigation and to hostile tender offers. 84 At
least one target corporation successfully alleged a section 1962(b) violation in resisting a hostile takeover. 85 This provision is easier to use
11. See, e.g., MacIntosh, supra note 5, at 67.
18. See supra note 16.
79. See, e.g., United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
80. See Long, supra note 7, at 229; MacIntosh, supra note 5, at 38; Note, Investing Dirty
Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974).
81. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
198,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (allegation that Agency filed misleading § 13(d) statements
following purchases of Gateway stock; Agency then used income from the sale of the Gateway
stock to purchase shares of Spencer in a takeover attempt). But see Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,
701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) (dismissing RICO claim based on § 1962(a) violation because
of, inter alia, insufficient evidence of the predicate acts); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP (CCH) 198,603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1982) (dismissing RICO
claim based in part on § 1962(a) violation because of insufficient evidence of the predicate acts
of racketeering).
82. See supra note 75.
83. See supra note 17.
84. Long, supra note 7, at 230.
85. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP._(CCH)
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than section 1962(a), because the alleged racketeering provides the direct
means of acquiring an interest in an enterprise. 86 Thus, alleging a section 1962(b) violation eliminates the need to trace the income from
the racketeering activity to the enterprise. 87
Third, the target may allege a violation of section 1962(c) - conducting
an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. 88 RICO litigation frequently includes this allegation, because, in contrast with the
preceding provisions, a plaintiff does not have to establish the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise. 89 Section 1962(c) violations have
been successfully alleged in resisting a hostile tender offer. 90 A target
corporation's use of this provision may be limited in the future, however,
if the tender offeror is a corporation. Some courts have held that a
corporate defendant cannot constitute both the ''person" violating section 1962(c), and the "enterprise" operated through racketeering. 91
Finally, a target corporation may allege a violation of section
1962(d) - conspiring to violate any of the preceding subsections. 92 No
target corporation has successfully alleged RICO's conspiracy provision in a hostile takeover. 93 Moreover, because any application of RICO
as a defense to a hostile tender offer would likely include violations
of the other provisions of section 1962, this provision will probably
not have a significant impact.
Establishing a violation of section 1962 is not a major barrier to using RICO to resist a hostile takeover. Nonetheless, courts must carefully
198,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (allegation that defendant filed false§ 13(d) statements during
the purchase of Spencer stock). But see Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, (1982 Transfer Binder] Fl!o.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (dismissing RICO claim based in part
on § 1962(b) violation on several grounds including insufficient evidence of racketeering); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,603 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 1982) (dismissing RICO claim based in part on § 1962(b) violation for insufficient
evidence of racketeering).
86. Long, supra note 7, at 230.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 18.
89. Long, supra note 7, at 231.
90. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
198,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (allegation that filing false§ 13(d) statements during a purchase
of stock is a violation of§ 1962(c)). Contra Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, (1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (dismissing RICO claim based in
part on a violation of § 1962(c)).
· 91. E.g., United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 112S, 113S (D. Mass. 1982). Contra United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990 (11th Cir. 1982) (a corporate defendant can be both the
person and the enterprise under § 1962(c)), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983); see also Blakey,
supra note 24, at 286-325.
92. See supra note 19.
93. The only hostile takeover case where a target corporation attempted to use a violation
of § 1962(d) resulted in a dismissal of all the RICO claims. Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, (1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982).
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scrutinize alleged section 1962 violations to ensure the presence of all
elements of the violation as well as the sufficiency of the connection
between the violation and the tender offer. 94 Rigorous judicial scrutiny
of alleged violations will ensure that the target's use of the Act conforms to the statutory language of section 1962.

C.

Injury By Reason of a Violation of Section 1962

Finally, the plaintiff in a civil RICO action must demonstrate an
injury to his business or property because of the violation of section
1962. 95 Many courts, using this injury requirement to li~it the application of RICO, require a certain type of injury to support a civil RICO
claim. 96 Although the limitation of civil RICO actions is a valid concern, this judicially-created requirement finds no support in either the
statutory language or the legislative history. 97 Moreover, such judicial
94. For example, in Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP (CCH) 198,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982), the court allowed the
use of the RICO Act as a defense to a hostile tender offer without an explanation of what specific
§ 1962 violations were alleged or the evidence which supported these allegations.
95. See supra note 24. It is important to note that RICO requires an injury due to the §
1962 violation and not due to the predicate acts of racketeering as defined in § 1961. See supra
note 12.
_
96. See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975) (holding that RICO requires an injury to the public inherent in the conduct
made unlawful); Liston v. USLIFE Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
199,033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 1982) (holding that RICO requires a bustness or commercial injury);
Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that RICO requires a racketeering enterprise injury, defined as a commercial injury caused by conducting an enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering); Harper v. New Japan Sec. lnt'l, 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D.
Cal. 1982) (holding that RICO requires an injury of the type the Act was intended to prevent);
Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,772 (E.D. Pa. July
13, 1982) (holding that RICO requires a marketplace injury); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982) (holding that RICO requires a commercial injury);
Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that RICO
requires a racketeering enterprise injury); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp.
207 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that RICO requires a competitive injury); cf. Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 1981) (holding that RICO applies to an injury in business relationships).
Other courts, however, which have specifically addressed the injury issue, do not require any
particular type of injury to maintain a civil RICO action. See, e.g., Schact v. Brown, [19821983 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 199,160 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 1983); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Rockwell Int'! Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Prudential Lines, Inc. v. McKean,
No. 80 Civ. 5853, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1982) (available Sept. 28, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
97. It has been suggested that because the language of RICO's civil remedy is similar to
that of the antitrust laws, the antitrust case law interpreting this language should be applied
to RICO's injury requirement. Mo_st courts, however, reject this notion and refuse to apply the
antitrust injury precedent to RICO. See, e.g., Schact v. Brown, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,160, at 95,607 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 1983). Moreover, Professor
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additions to the Act lead to inconsistent requirements for civil RICO
actions and confuse rather than clarify the application of the Act. Any
limitation upon the type of injury necessary for a civil RICO action
should come from Congress rather than the courts. 98
The injury requirement could, however, limit the application of civil
RICO if courts carefully scrutinized RICO claims for the presence of
any injury due to the violation of section 1962. The presence of an
injury to the shareholders of the target corporation is the critical factor in determining whether RICO should be allowed as a defense to
a hostile corporate takeover.
III.

LIMITING THE USE

OF

RICO: THE INJURY REQUIREMENT

After a target corporation alleges a pattern of racketeering and a
violation of section 1962, it must then demonstrate an injury to its
business or property. 99 Determining the presence of an injury during
a hostile corporate takeover requires an examination of possible injury to three groups: the target's shareholders who tender their stock,
the target's shareholders who retain their stock, and the target's management. In addition, the target's use of RICO to resist a hostile tak~over
must conform to the policies and application of the federal securities
laws. This analysis of RICO's injury requirement indicates that the
target should be allowed to use RICO as a defense to a hostile cash
tender offer only if it can demonstrate that the shareholders who retained their stock will be injured by the takeover.
During most hostile cash tender offers, shareholders of the target
corporation who tender their stock do not suffer any economic injury.
Rather, these shareholders obtain an economic benefit by selling their
stock at a price significantly above the current market price. 100 If the
Blakey states that the drafters of RICO did not intend the antitrust injury precedent to apply
to the Act because the policies and purposes of RICO differ significantly from those of the
antitrust laws. Blakey, supra note 24, at 2S3-S6, 263; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 13, at 60.
Furthermore, although RICO was originally conceived as an addition to the antitrust laws, an
American Bar Association study group, noting that the underlying theory of the antitrust laws
did not conform to the purposes of RICO, suggested that RICO be removed from the antitrust
area and included instead in the more comprehensive organized crime control legislation. Blakey,
supra note 24, at 2S4-S6.
98. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 24, at 28S (suggesting that courts are redrafting rather than
reading RICO); Note, supra note S4, at 191 (suggesting that any problems with the RICO Act
should be addressed by Congress and not by judicial redrafting).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
· 100. . See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 41, at 1173. A target corporation
may allege that tendering shareholders are injured because the premium offered by the tender
offerer is less than the ''true" value of the shares. See supra note 43. Even in this case, however,
courts should not recognize an injury for the purpose of using the RICO Act. Although tendering shareholders may not be as well off as they theoretically could be, they still receive more
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target management defeats the tender offer against the best interest
of the shareholders, the shareholders may have a cause of action against
management for the lost opportunity to receive this profit. 101 Thus,
these shareholders suffer no injury which could satisfy the injury requirement of the RICO Act. 102
In most hostile cash tender offers, shareholders of the target corporation who retain their stock also suffer no injury. These shareholders
typically enjoy an appreciation in their investment because the tender
offeror will presumably better manage the target. 103 A tender offeror
generally purchases a target's stock in order to receive the profit to
be gained from improved management of the target. 104 Apart from
better management, the synergy created by the consolidation of the
two corporations increases the value of the stock of the nontendering
shareholders. ios For both reasons, shareholders who retain stock suffer no injury which can satisfy the injury requirement of the RICO
Act.106
for their shares than the current market price and thus they are not "injured." See Easterbrook
& Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 41, at 1175.
· 101. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972); see also Fischel, supra note 35, at 2; Fleischer, supra note 42, at 865; Gelfond &
Sebastian, supra note 41, at 449. See generally McIntyre, supra note 44. Shareholders may, however,
find it difficult to maintain such suits. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra
note 41, at 1163.
102. Many authorities accept the theory that corporate takeovers are generally beneficial because
they move the target's assets to a higher-value utilizer, encourage investment, and thus benefit
shareholders of both the target and the tender offeror. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper
Role, supra note 41, at 1182-88; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 41, at 1741,
1145. But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. IOI (1979); Lowenstein, supra note 41. Moreover, although a recent SEC report characteriz.ed takeovers as a valid
method of capital allocation but found insufficient evidence of their economic benefit, the report
did conclude that, at least in certain cases, takeovers disciplined inefficient target management
and led to increased productivity. SEC ADVISORY CoMMITTEE, supra note 41, at 7-8. Thus, the
advisory committee found insufficient reason to either discourage or promote takeovers. Id. at 9.
103. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 41, at 1174; Easterbrook &
Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 41, at 1741.
104. See, e.g., P. STEINER, supra note 42, at 136. This anticipated profit balances the costs
incurred by the tender offeror to effect the takeover. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role,
supra note 41, at 1174, 1178. Other motives, howevert may prompt a hostile tender offer. A
tender offeror may seek to control the target for investment or tax reasons, to force the sale of
the target's assets, or to force the merger of the two corporations. See P. STEINER, supra
note 42, at 136-40; Bebchuk, supra note 43, at 34; Brudney, supra note 41, at 610; Gelfond
& Sebastian, supra note 41, at 456; Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 265.
105. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 43, at 223; Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 41, at 457.
This is based on the theory that takeovers are generally beneficial. See supra note 102.
106. A target corporation may allege that nontendering shareholders are injured if the tender
offeror offers a premium which is less than the "true" value of the shares. See supra note 43.
This reduced premium would indicate that the target's assets would be controlled by a lowervalue utilizer, reducing the appreciation in the investment of the shareholders who retain their
stock. Id. Courts should not recognize this difference between the tender offer premium and
the "true value" as an injury for the purpose of the RICO Act because the nontendering
shareholders are still better off than they would have been without the tender offer. Although
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In some circumstances, however, the takeover will injure shareholders
of the target who retain their stock. This may occur, for example, if
the tender offeror does not plan to improve the target corporation,
but rather intends to acquire personal gain at the expense of the target.
Tender offerors could have many motives which may not be beneficial
to target shareholder welfare. The tender offeror may seek to acquire
the power and prestige of controlling the target, to obtain tax benefits,
to force a merger or sale of the target's assets, or to liquidate the target
corporation. 101 Thus, the shareholders who retain their stock may be
economically harmed by this type of takeover. 108 This shareholder injury could satisfy the injury requirement of RICO and justify the target
corporation's use of RICO to resist the takeover.
Similarly, a tender offeror who purchases enough shares to threaten
a full takeover, and who then sells these shares back to the target corporation at a significant profit over the tender offer price, may injure
those shareholders who retain their stock. 109 This tactic, increasing in
frequency, 110 occurred in at least two of the recent takeover cases involving RICO. 111 In this situation, the target's shareholders who retain their stock suffer an injury because the repurchase of the shares
consumes the target's resources and thereby decreases the value of the

nontendering shareholders may not be as well off as they theoretically could be, the value of
their investment will usually increase and thus they are not injured. See supra note 100.
107. See, e.g., P. STSINER, supra note 42, at 136, 140; Bebchuk, supra note 43, at 34; Brudney,
supra note 41, at 610; Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 41, at 456; Lowenstein, supra note 41, ·
at 26S-66.
108. If the tender offeror obtains control and acts to the detriment of the target corporation,
the nontendering shareholders may be injured if the value of their investment decreases. See,
e.g., P. STEINER, supra note 42, at 140 (suggesting that, in certain circumstances, a tender offeror may force an economically unsound merger which does not maximii.e shareholder welfare);
Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 41, at 4S4-S8 (suggesting that some takeovers may not encourage economic efficiency).
·
109. For example, Carl Icahn has used this approach with at least six targets. According
to one estimate, he has "successfully dislodged over $83 million from various American corporations." N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1982, § D, at 4, col. 1; see also Bos. WK., May 24, 1982, at 91.
110. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1982, § D, at 4, col. 1; Bos. WK., May 24, 1982, at 91. An increasing number of tender offerors succeed in selling the tendered shares back to the target corporation. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 310. One commentator suggests that this tactic
is reaching epidemic proportions. Blustein, supra note 34. In addition, if a tender offeror's history
includes this strategy, nondisclosure of this information may be considered a violation of the
securities laws. See, e.g., General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (holding that nondisclosure of the tender offeror's past history may constitute a material
omission). If, however, the public is sufficiently aware of the information, then a court may
not find a disclosure violation. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1982}.
111. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983}; Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH} 198,603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1982); see also
Memorandum of Spencer Companies In Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 24, Spencer Cos.
v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH} 198,361 (D. Mass.
Nov. 17, 1981}.
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corporation and the value of the shareholders' investment. 112 This harm
to the shareholders could satisfy RICO's injury requirement and validate
the target's use of RICO to resist the takeover. 113
Limiting the use of RICO to hostile cash tender offers in which the
target's shareholders who retain stock suffer an injury conforms to
the policies of the federal securities laws. The federal securities laws
disfavor any interference in contests for corporate control. 114
Nonetheless, courts recognize an exception to this principle if it will
protect the shareholders' interest. For example, courts allow target corporations to obtain injunctive relief to enforce the disclosure requirements of the securities laws. 115 Full dis.closure benefits. the target's
112. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 41, at 1175. The money paid
to tender offerors to repurchase the tendered shares wastes corporate assets and could be better
spent investing in new plants or equipment for the target corporation. E.g., Blustein, supra note
34. In a few instances, however, the repurchase of tendered shares may benefit retaining
stockholders ·by enlisting a competing bidder who may offer a higher premium. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 41, at 1738-39; see also supra note 43.
113. Courts may not, however, recognize an injury for the purpose of the RICO Act in two
circumstances. First, there should be no RICO injury if the repurchase of the shares was not
in the shareholders' best interest, and thus violated management's fiduciary duty. W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 1S94; see also Fleischer, supra note 42, at 8S9; Gelfond &
Sebastian, supra note 41, at 433. During a hostile takeover, target management can resist only
if resisting will benefit the shareholders; management cannot resist if their motivation is merely
to preserve their own jobs. E.g., Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 66, at 914-1S. Thus, if management repurchases the tendered shares merely to preserve their own jobs and not because a takeover
· would harm the nontendering shareholders, there is no threat to shareholders which justifies
using the RICO Act.
Second, the injury analysis under the RICO Act may lead to different results if the tender
offeror utilizes an exchange offer rather than a cash tender offer. See supra note 38. In an exchange tender offer, shareholders of the target corporation exchange their shares for shares of
the corporate tender offeror. If the target corporation then brings a RICO action against the
tender offeror, any judgment in the target's favor will hafm its former shareholders who are
now shareholders of the tender offeror. This may conflict with the policy of the federal securities
laws which is to protect shareholders of the target. See, e.g., Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein,
Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 175S (1977).
114. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, S8 (1975), in which the Court commented on the neutral position of the Williams Act:
The Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management
to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock which would create
the potential for such attempts. Indeed, the Act's draftsmen commented upon the "extreme care" which was taken "to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."
(citations omitted); see also supra notes 39 & 64-6S.
115. Courts recognize an implied private right of action of target corporations to enforce
the disclosure requirements of § 14(d). See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). Target corporations also may obtain equitable relief under § 14(e).
See, e.g., Butler Aviation lnt'I, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 42S F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1970); see also supra note 64. In addition, courts recognize an implied private right of action
of target corporations to enforce the disclosure requirements of § 13(d). See, e.g., Dan River,
Inc. v. Unitex, Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 4S3 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1971); Wellman v. Dickinson, 47S F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d
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shareholders without favoring either the target management or the tender
offeror. 116 This fulfills the neutral position of the securities laws, neither
encouraging nor discouraging hostile tender offers. 117 Similarly, allowing
the target to bring a RICO action when shareholders who retain stock
are injured also benefits the target's shareholders and accords with this
neutrality.
Even if the target's shareholders suffer no injury, target management might allege a possible injury to itself because it may lose control of the corporation. Nonetheless, because courts do not_ recognize
loss of control as an injury under the federal securities laws, 118 courts
should not recognize this injury as falling within the provisions of the
RICO Act. During many takeovers, target management's interest in
defeating the takeover to retain its position and control may conflict
with the shareholders' interest in receiving the benefits of a successful
takeover . 119 If the injury to management's control satisfied RICO's
355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983); see also supra note 65. Courts allow
target corporations to enforce these disclosure requirements because this benefits the target's
shareholders, the shareholders are the class for whom the federal securities laws were enacted,
Congress intended such private rights of action, and this remedy is consistent with the federal
legislative scheme and with actions based on state _law. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
116. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) ("The purpose of the
Williams Act is to ensure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer
for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party.") (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 114-15.
Moreover, a target corporation is in the best position to enforce the disclosure requirements
of the federal securities laws by acting as a private attorney general to supplement action by
.the SEC. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 699 (2d
Cir. 1973); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2d Cir. 1971); Berman v. Metzger, (1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 197,857, at 90,294 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981); see also
S-O Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American
Medicorp, Inc., (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 196,298 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
1978); Note, supra note 38, at 715.
117. In an effort to maintain a neutral position during contests for corporate control, courts
frequently express the view that effective relief is best given as an injunction to enforce the disclosure
requirements of the securities laws. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969). An award of damages, on the other hand, may deter
future corporate takeovers. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981); Berman v. Metzger, (1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,857, at 90,294
(D.D.C. Feb 9, 1981). Thus, a target corporation may sue for damages only if its shareholders
will benefit. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1522 (1983).
118. For example, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 516 F.2d 172, 190 (2d Cir. 1975), a defeated
tender offerer sued the target corporation for violations of the federal securities laws and was
awarded $25 million in damages for loss of opportunity to obtain control of the target. Aranow,
Einhorn & Berlstein, supra note 113, at 1756-57. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment,
stating that a defeated tender offeror lacked standing to sue for damages under. the Williams
Act because such a suit would not benefit the target's shareholders. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court also stated that, although the tender offerer could pursue its remedy
under state law for damages due to lost opportunity for control, such a remedy could not derive
from the federal securities laws. Id.
119. See, e.g., P. STEINER, supra note 42, at 131, 145.
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injury requirement, this would increase the likelihood that management would use RICO against the best interests of its shareholders.
Moreover, recognition of management's loss-of-control injury under
the RICO Act may actually harm shareholders by discouraging hostile
takeovers. 120
Furthermore, recognition of management's loss-of-control injury for
the purposes of the RICO Act conflicts with the policies of the federal
securities laws which were designed to protect only shareholders. 121
Because Congress intended consistency between RICO and the securities
laws, and because a target corporation can bring a cause of action
under the federal securities laws only if it will benefit its shareholders, 122
a target corporation should be allowed to use RICO to resist a hostile
cash tender offer only in instances of shareholder injury.
CONCLUSION
'

As the use of the RICO Act's civil remedy continues to expand,
it will undoubtedly appear with increasing frequency as a defense to
hostile corporate takeovers. 123 The critical factor in analyzing this use
of RICO is the Act's injury requirement. In most hostile cash tender
offers, the target's shareholders who tender their stock suffer no injury but, instead, enjoy economic benefits from the premium paid for
their shares. The target's shareholders who retain their stock also receive
economic benefits, because the tender offeror will improve the economic
position of the target and increase the value of the shareholders' investment. Thus, in the typical hostile cash tender offer, no shareholder
injury occurs to fulfill RICO's injury requirement. In some instances,
however, the tender offeror may intend to act to the disadvantage of
the target's shareholders who retained their stock, and they may suffer an economic injury from the takeover. This injury may justify the
use of RICO by the target corporation to resist the takeover. Because
such an injury will occur in only a small number of takeovers, a target
corporation will be limited in its use of RICO to resist a takeover.
Although most hostile cash tender offers injure the target's management insofar as it loses control of the corporation, this loss-of-control
injury should not fulfill RICO's injury requirement. Allowing manage120. See supra note 117.
121. See supra notes 114 & 116.
122. See supra note 115.
123. Some commentators fear that this new use of RICO may actually reduce the number
of hostile corporate takeovers. E.g., A New Ploy to Fight Takeovers, Bus. WK., May 24, 1982,
at 91. Moreover, some commentators express concern that RICO claims will continue to appear
as defenses in hostile corporate takeovers merely for their embarrassment and intimidation value.
E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct, 14, 1982, § D, at 4, col. I.
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ment to use RICO for loss of corporate control would favor target
management during takeovers and conflict with the neutrality of the
federal securities laws. This use of RICO would also reduce the effectiveness of hostile takeovers as a check against inefficient target
management.
As RICO litigation continues to expand into new and unexpected
areas, courts will continue to face the problem of limiting the use of
the Act to appropriate circumstances. The use of RICO as a defense
to hostile corporate takeovers illustrates many of the problems encountered in limiting RICO's application. Courts can avoid some of
these difficulties by strictly applying the language of the statute and
by considering the impact of RICO on other federal laws. In limiting
RICO as a defense to a hostile corporate takeover, this involves careful
judicial scrutiny for the presence of an injury to the target shareholders,
and an examination of. the interaction between RICO and the federal
securities laws.
-Mary Ann Lesniak

